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Abstract 
Poland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allows 
Poland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing it – 
as is projected for the majority of other OECD countries. This paper presents the 
conceptual background of the new system design. The new system’s long-term 
objective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographic 
situation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retired 
generation. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share of 
GDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for a 
couple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree led 
to severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed in 
numerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems in 
different ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although the 
Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs from 
the typical approaches – and the lessons and results are promising for all OECD 
countries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of this 
alternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension system 
design. 
Keywords: pensions, equilibrium, GDP, pension debt servicing, income allocation, 
generations. 
JEL codes: D50, H55, H63. 
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I.       Introduction 
Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems in 
the area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditional 
pension systems’ design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lack 
of control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system 
design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth and 
contributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reform 
is now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe. 
However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in the 
area of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For the 
purposes of this paper, “reform” means changing the system in order to remove 
structural inefficiencies – and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates 
and retirement ages to adjust the system’s parameters for short-term fiscal and 
political reasons.
3 
Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies with 
social security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by a 
lack of consensus on what could replace the traditional system. Discussions on this 
issue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussion 
participants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you-go” versus 
“funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number of 
important economic issues. 
Furthermore, economists have traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and running 
pension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concerned 
with how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pension 
systems’ negative externalities. The new Polish pension system belongs to very small 
number of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions
4. This 
does not mean – as some may assume – giving up social security goals. Rather, the 
key idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in order 
to save its goals and principles. 
                                                 
3 This distinction plays important role in thinking on pension reforms. For more discussion see Góra 
and Rutkowski (1998), also Holzmann, Orenstein and Rutkowski (2003). 
4 Sweden and UK are among other examples of successful pension reforms. 2 
This paper consists of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issues 
that need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues are 
presented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions. 
In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that most 
countries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pension 
systems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutions 
in one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same. 
Like European states such as France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late 
1990’s developed inefficient, costly pension systems. As such, in part two of the 
paper we shall examine how Poland has now successfully implemented the approach 
presented in the first part of the paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutral 
pension system. 
 
II.  Selected general issues 
Pension system design has to take into account a number of issues. Their full 
presentation and discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5 This paper presents 
only a list of the issues for consideration and the most important observations. 
 
The pension system: externalities versus neutrality 
The description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated and 
individual viewpoint. 
¾ From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing current 
GDP between a part kept by the working generation (GDP
W) and a part allocated 
to the retired generation (GDP
R). 
¾ From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocation 
over a person’s life cycle. 
                                                 
5 For broader explanation and discussion of theoretical background of author’s views on the pension 
system see Góra (2003a). 3 
The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideological 
viewpoint. The pension system – as defined above – is not necessarily pay-as-you-go 
or funded.  Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the top 
of the pension system, rather than from the system itself. If the pension system design 
assumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then we 
usually call this system pay-as-you-go. If the pension system design uses financial 
markets, then we usually call it funded.  
However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all possible combinations 
of anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financial 
pension system design techniques used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus funded 
approach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system that 
does not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that using 
financial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) or 
deferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviously 
not the same. 
Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generates 
externalities. These externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution within 
the pension system can generate positive externalities if the system is inexpensive, 
namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If the 
redistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing to 
persistently high unemployment and weak growth. Using financial markets causes 
positive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money on 
investment. If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead to 
negative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more tax 
distortions. This can happen if the rate of return on government debt is persistently 
above the rate of GDP growth. 
There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close to 
economic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combining 
individual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations based 
on real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden. 
 4 
Demographic structure: consequences of the change 
Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension system 
exchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the working 
generation. The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can be 
expressed in various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financial 
markets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on political 
promise. In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pension rights. The working 
generation finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retired 
generation sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the working 
generation. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework for 
this market. 
Given the contribution rate, the demand side of the market is determined by the 
number of workers and their productivity. The number of retirees determines the 
demand side. However, if – as it is the case in traditional systems – pensions are 
administratively defined in terms of wages (replacement rate promised) then the 
pension system depends solely on the demographic structure. Even strong 
productivity growth cannot help in balancing the system’s revenue and expenditure. 
The general change of the demographic structure we see around the world has caused 
the pyramid scheme used for financing pension expenditure to no longer generate 
sufficient revenues. In consequence, previous minor inefficiencies have become 
devastating. Ageing turned the previous “pyramid-shape” demographic structure into 
a new “hut-shape” one, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Demographic structure and the pension system 
 
 
 
The pension system strongly depends on the demographic structure of the population. 
There is no escape from this dependency irrespective of pension system technique 
used. Using financial markets do not make pension systems immune from this 
dependency. Financial markets do help, however, in adjusting the system to the 
current demographic situation by introducing an easy to understand and acceptable 
link between benefits and contributions paid. 
The general change of the demographic structure around the world has caused severe 
fiscal problems for many countries. This change can be seen also from the viewpoint 
of being able to achieve the traditional social goals of the pension system. In this 
regard, two important observations are worth mentioning: 
¾ In the past, the minority – nowadays the vast majority – of those who pay 
contributions to the system as workers, afterwards receive benefits as retirees. This 
means that in the active phase of the individual’s life, participation in the pension 
system is very similar to long term saving. As the goal is to provide for each 
individual, using the individual as the main accounting unit becomes a superior 
way to organize the pension system. 
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¾ In the past, the pension system channelled GDP
R to the very old people who were 
unable to earn a living and finance consumption on their own. Nowadays people 
who retire are still able to work and earn, and they – on average have many years 
of life left to live. 
As such, the discussion above shows that the objective of the pension system has 
changed for the old-age part of the pension system (OA). However, the non-old-age 
parts of social security systems (NOA), such as disability, remain risk related, 
irrespective to ageing. This leads to the conclusion that the various parts of the social 
security system should be segmented, such that revenues (contributions) and expenses 
(benefits) can be tied to their purpose exclusively over time, and each segment 
insulated from each other.
7 In this way, policy makers would be able to look at each 
segment of the social security system, knowing that its revenues and expenses have 
been insulated from the risks of other parts of the system and are an accurate 
reflection of the current state of that segment and together of the system as a whole. 
The social security system, would then be made of an OA segment (pensions) and 
various NOA segments (disability, maternity, worker’s compensation, and so forth). 
This operational and accounting reform is one of the most important non-fiscal 
reasons for a deep pension reform and would provide policy makers with a powerful 
tool to understand how well their social security system can and will meet its goals. 
 
Macroeconomic consequences of demographic change 
Traditional pension systems try to keep constant the part of GDP per retiree 
( const
L
GDP
R = ).
8 This is why the demographic change Europe faces strongly affects 
its growth. This problem applies, at least partially, to other continents as well. Fewer 
people produce GDP; more people participate in dividing GDP who did not 
participate in producing it. At the aggregated level, ageing leads to an increase of the 
GDP
GDP
R
 ratio. We can call this ratio the economic dependency ratio (EDR). 
                                                 
7 This is much like would be done in the financial statements/accounting treatment of a company, when 
one is trying to analyse which are the profit and loss making operations. 
8 This arrangement is usually called defined benefit. In my opinion this is only partially correct. 
Defined benefit, as well as defined contribution is a term appropriate for voluntary (partial) 
programmes rather than for universal systems. 7 
Consequently, a smaller part of GDP is spent on rewarding employment of production 
factors and productivity growth, which slows down growth. At the individual level, 
ageing leads to turning insurance-based participation in the pension system into social 
tax based participation, which adds to tax distortions slowing down growth. Both 
effects became strong in last decades of the twentieth century and – according to 
projections – will be even stronger in the decades to come. Table 5 provides 
projections for OECD countries. The general macroeconomic consequences are 
presented in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, line A represents projected values of the EDR rate growing due to the 
demographic change as well as to political decisions on the systems’ generosity 
(replacement rate, retirement age). The larger EDR rate the weaker, ceteris paribus, 
growth.
9 We can already observe this in many economies (see Table 5). Line B 
represents stabilisation of the EDR rate on a current level. Line C represents reduction 
of the EDR rate to an optimal level. The analysis of how the optimal EDR level could 
be defined would be the subject of another paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 If we assumed the extreme situation, namely EDR = 1, then GDP would be close to zero. 8 
Figure 2. Developments of the share of GDP allocated to the retired generation 
 
Each generation is first a working generation that buys pension rights, and afterwards 
a retired generation selling accumulated rights. If each generation’s welfare is equally 
important then it is the only Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (Nash equilibrium if we 
define generations as players) that is Pareto optimal. It requires each generation 
receives from the pension system present value of benefits equal to the present value 
of contributions paid.
10 If one generation received more than it paid in, then another 
generation would receive less than it paid in. In such situation, preferences are 
inconsistent in the period of participation in the pension system, hence, there is no 
equilibrium at all, or the system prefers one generation over others, hence it enforces 
allocation not being Nash equilibrium. 
In order to avoid causing persistently weak growth, the pension system should be 
designed in a way that stabilises the EDR ratio instead of stabilising GDP per retiree. 
However, the current contribution rate is not necessarily optimal. Pension system 
design should also take into account individual preferences on the scale of income 
                                                 
10 Discounting factor is the GDP growth rate. 
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allocation. Since returns in universal (mandatory) pension systems are lower or are 
perceived as lower that would be possible in voluntary savings, the mandatory 
contributions should be kept as low as possible just to avoid myopia and free riding. 
Promised generous pensions are not necessarily good. The same concerns all leakages 
from the pension system such as inheriting account values or annuities. If, for 
instance, pension rights (including account values) can be inherited, then higher 
contributions are needed in order to generate the same level of pensions. 
 
Coverage: Universal versus partial 
Universal pension systems are needed to avoid the costs of myopia and free riding. At 
the same time, due to mandatory participation – which is the only way to ensure 
universal coverage – universal pension systems generate negative externalities. The 
larger a pension system is, the stronger the negative externalities are. Generous 
universal schemes are not necessary good ones, as a promised high level of income 
after retirement imposes a high burden before retirement. 
Universal coverage strongly differs from partial coverage based on voluntary 
decisions and responsibility. This issue is extremely important, because in many cases 
reforming pension systems means either creating incentives for participation in 
voluntary programmes or just making mandatory previously voluntary programmes. 
However, designing a good universal pension system needs more. 
The following points are a number of examples that illustrate the difference between 
universal and partial coverage. 
¾  Inheriting account values or other forms of pension rights is natural in partial 
programmes. In universal systems inheriting pension rights just increases 
mandatory costs imposed on workers. 
¾  Offering participants a wide choice of decisions is requisite in partial programmes. 
In universal systems, a wide degree of decisions may lead to creating the 
possibility to make mistakes or obtain additional benefits at the expense of the rest 
of population. 
¾  Buying government debt is natural in partial programmes and makes sense 
especially when interest on this debt is high. This means redistribution from those 10 
who have not bought this debt to those who have. In universal systems this means 
redistribution from everybody to everybody and may lead to a need to increase 
taxes. 
 
Generosity: Adjusting pensions in advance 
Stabilisation of the EDR ratio, given projected demographic change, leads to a 
reduction in the replacement rate. This can be a social argument against such an 
approach. Actually this argument is widely used in public discussions. However, the 
argument is based on the assumption that governments are able to keep increasing the 
EDR ratio. The assumption is hardly acceptable given current levels of the tax wedge 
and resistance against substantial increases in the retirement age in the OECD area 
and also in many countries outside this area. 
In fact, running a traditional system that promises constant a  R L
GDP  ratio is similar to 
running a Ponzi scheme.
11 One can argue that counter to the Ponzi scheme the 
universal pension system can be subsidised, which is usually called a “state 
guarantee”. However, this “state guarantee” brings us back to the problem of whether 
the tax wedge can be further increased. In the long run – which is the appropriate 
horizon for thinking on pensions – the  . const
L
GDP
R =  regime could be maintained 
only if dependency ratio fluctuated over a long run average. This regime cannot be 
maintained if, ceteris paribus, the opposite holds. Irrespective to the particular design 
of the pension system, workers who pay contributions now will not receive the same 
individual share of GDP as the current generation of retirees – unless they and their 
children pay higher contributions or taxes, which would mean increasing the EDR 
rate. Summarising, the long-term sustainable level of the replacement rate (z) is 
determined by the dependency ratio (d) and the choice of the contribution rate (c
W) 
financed by the working generation.
12 
(1) 
d
c z W 1
=  
                                                 
11 This was always known, but was however, neglected. 
12 The true contribution rate includes subsidies financed out of general taxes. 11 
Given the share of wages in GDP, the decision on the contribution rate determines the 
share of GDP allocated to the retired generation (EDR). 
However, the real value of future pensions depends not only on the replacement rate 
but also on value of GDP itself. Thus, a pension system based on a stable EDR ratio 
will contribute to stronger GDP growth and will provide higher pensions than a 
system in which a growing share of GDP
R would slow down GDP growth. 
In the short run Equation (1) can be violated. Namely the replacement rate can be kept 
above the sustainable level, through further increasing pension system debt that will 
never be paid back. This is a temptation for politicians all over the world (and one to 
which they often succumb). However, in the long run, given obvious limits for 
increasing the contribution rate, future reduction of the replacement ratio is inevitable 
with or without a reform. So there are only two options: 
¾  either a reform, which means cutting down pension expectations (expressed as the 
replacement rate) ex ante; 
¾  or no reform, which will lead to cutting down pensions ex post. 
Choosing the latter would just be cheating the current generation of workers. It should 
be made clear that a small working population will never be able to provide a large 
retired population with relative per capita income at the level comparable to what was 
possible in the case of large working population sharing its product with a small 
retired population.
13 
 
Different types of individual accounts 
Individual participation in the pension system needs individual accounts in order to 
register pension obligations owned by participants. The accounts can be of three 
different types, namely non-financial accounts (NDC), financial accounts based on 
government debt (FDCGD), and financial accounts based on private equities (FDCPE). 
These accounts differ in two main ways. First, whose liability is the obligation created 
by contributions paid into the system; second, how is the rate of return earned 
                                                 
13 This can be overcome only if the consecutive working generations accept a downward trend in 
rewarding of labour and capital. 12 
financed by these contributions. There are a number of other differences of which the 
most important ones are presented in Table 1.
14 
 
Table 1. Three types of individual accounts 
Type of 
(DC) 
system 
Liability of:  Returns 
financed 
through: 
Rate of 
return 
Political risk: 
manipulation 
Economic risk: 
What happens if r > g
NDC Government  Real 
economy 
r ≡ g  Moderate or 
even small 
Not possible 
FDCGD Government  Financial 
markets 
r = rGD  Small GDP
R/GDP increases 
due to higher taxes 
FDCPE Private 
sector 
Financial 
markets 
r = rPE  Very small  GDP
R/GDP increases 
due to higher asset 
prices 
In the table: g – GDP growth rate; r – pension system rate of return. 
 
In order to avoid substantial leakage from the pension system, as well as to avoid 
failing to achieve the social goal of the system, each account type should be 
annuitised at the moment of retirement. Without annuitisation, and if participants 
overestimate their longevity, then pension obligations will be inherited and finance 
non-pension goals. There is no sense in mandating people to participate in the pension 
system and afterwards let their obligations finance goals that can be better financed 
outside the mandatory system. Instead it is much better to reduce contributions in 
advance. On the other hand, if participants underestimate their longevity then a social 
problem will arise. It will have to be solved by increasing taxes. Both cases will 
generate negative externalities. 
All three types of individual accounts provide the system with stability (Equation 2) at 
the macro level, and safety, transparency and fairness at the micro level (Equation 3). 
(2)  ) ( ) ( B PV C PV
t t =  
                                                 
14 More on different types of individual accounts can be read in Góra and Palmer (2002). 13 
C, B – contribution and benefit sum. 
The present value of the sum of benefits paid out from the system equals the present 
value of the sum of contributions paid into the system. Both sums can fluctuate. In 
order to smooth fluctuations technical reserves need to be created. 
(3)  )] ( [ ) (
i t i t b PV E c PV =  
ci, bi – individual contributions and benefits. 
Expected value of individual benefits (annuities) received from the system equals the 
present value of individual contributions paid to the system. 
In addition to the features mentioned above, each type of individual account causes 
specific effects. 
¾  The NDC type of pension system is the easiest to implement (no costs, no fiscal 
problems). After maturation NDC divides GDP between generations in a stable 
proportion. NDC is neutral by definition. 
¾  FDCGD is more difficult for implementation (no costs, some fiscal problems). If 
for any reason government debt is overvalued by the financial markets (r > g) then 
the pension system may contribute to an increase in taxation. A benefit is that this 
type of account contributes to the development of the financial markets. 
¾  FDCPE is the most difficult for implementation (some (minor) costs, fiscal 
problems). FDCPE generates positive externalities for growth, such as increased 
investment. In the case of this type of account it is also possible that r > g. 
However, this problem can be solved by the reduction of the contribution rate, 
which will offset the increase of the scale of allocation of GDP to the retired 
generation. 
The three types of individual accounts differ from each other in many ways. The 
differences, however, have very little, if anything, to do with the traditional opposition 
of pay-as-you-go and funding, as none of the account types can be attributed to pay-
as-you-go systems. 
One can argue that both versions of FDC are superior to NDC, as they provide 
participants with better protection of their rights against political manipulation. This 
could be true, but only to some extent. Actually, all three types of individual accounts 14 
protect pension rights much better than can be achieved without such accounts. FDC 
can also be affected by politics through the manipulation of taxation. 
However, what matters much more is the fact that pension systems pay more than 
they can afford to. Even if FDC really protected the pension rights better than NDC 
this does not matter much, as it is rewarding production factors that need to be 
protected. Pension systems attempt to increase GDP
R at the expense of the working 
population. The real risk pension systems are exposed at is inflating pension rights 
rather than violating them. 
 
Pension system participation: Individualisation versus privatisation 
Individualisation of pension system participation plays an important role in the 
pension system. Individualisation reduces the perception that pension contributions 
are taxes; hence, this reduces tax distortions and contributes to stronger growth. 
However, individualisation should not be confused with privatisation of the system. 
Privatisation can be applied to system management, contracts, claims, and/or asset 
management.
15 Each of these activity areas could be in either the public or the private 
domain. Individualisation creates a full and transparent link between contributions 
and returns on them on one hand, and benefits on the other. 
The rationale behind mandating participation in the universal pension system is to 
achieve a public goal. This is the only element of the system that cannot be privatised. 
The system remains public, even if it is privately managed. 
 
Pensions: Summary of the proposed approach 
Typically pension economics, as well as popular discussions, use the following 
opposing concepts as a central basis for thinking on pensions: 
¾ Pay-as-you-go versus funding; 
¾ Public versus private; 
¾ Monopillar versus multipillar. 
                                                 
15 See Góra and Palmer (2002). 15 
This paper presents an alternative approach. This alternative approach can be 
summarised in the following four pairs of opposing concepts: 
¾ Universal (mandatory covering the entire population) versus partial (voluntary 
participation of a group of people); 
¾ Individualised (individual accounts) versus anonymous (no accounts) participation; 
¾ Task specific/segmented (OA separated from NOA) versus multitask (OA and 
NOA mixed within one scheme) organisation of social security; 
¾ Financial (generating the rate of return through financial markets) versus non-
financial (generating the rate of return through real economy growth). 
The efficient pension system is designed in a way that makes it endogenous, which 
means it adjusts automatically without intervening from outside. The system needs 
only one decision, namely the initial choice of the contribution rate. 
The way of thinking on pensions based on the above set of comparisons can be useful 
for better describing and analysing the pension system. This approach can also let the 
discussion on pensions go beyond the hopeless controversy of those who promote 
private funded pension funds and those who promote what is called the pay-as-you-go 
system. 
As such policy makers in the European Union and elsewhere could benefit using the 
proposed methodology when looking at reforming their pension systems. 
 
III.  Key features of the new Polish pension system 
The new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the above 
described way of thinking in practice. The system named “Security through 
Diversity” started on 1 January 1999. It entirely replaced previous regulations on old-
age pensions for majority of working population. Designing the new system from 
scratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system. Instead, the 
new system design is simple and transparent. The main goal was to design a system 
that can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespective of 
population ageing. 16 
The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existing 
elsewhere. Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension system 
based on similar principles and started on the same day.
16 At the same time, within 
this general framework the new Polish system uses a number of technical concepts 
developed in other countries. This brief presentation of the new Polish pension system 
focuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside most 
technical details. 
The following bullets help in grasping the essence of the concept of the new Polish 
system design. 
¾ Focusing on the universal part of the pension system; 
¾ Separation of the old-age part of social security (OA) from the non-old-age parts of 
social security (NOA); and segmenting the flows of revenue; 
¾ Termination of the OA part of the previous system; 
¾ Creation of a new OA pension system, entirely based on individual accounts; 
¾ Accrual accounting within the OA system; 
¾ Splitting each person’s OA contributions between two accounts (first account – 
NDC, second account – FDC); 
¾ Annuitisation of account values (NDC as well as FDC) at the moment of 
retirement; 
¾ Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below 
certain level (financed out of the state budget). 
NDC – individual accounts based on government quasi-bonds (idea similar to 
Buchanan bonds) not traded in financial markets, bringing a rate of return that equals 
the wage sum growth (GDP growth in long run).
17 
FDC – individual accounts based on instruments traded in financial markets.
18 
                                                 
16 For comprehensive information on the new Swedish pension system see Palmer (2002). 
17 At the moment, there is a kind of tax imposed on NDC returns. Its role is to reduce GDP
R sooner. 
18 There is no tax on returns at the moment. 17 
It should be strongly stressed that both accounts are annuitised at the same moment 
and play exactly the same role within social security. In particular there is no such 
element of the system as a “basic state pension”. Social redistribution exists but it has 
been moved out from the pension system. The sole role of the pension system is 
providing working generation with an efficient method of income allocation over their 
life cycle. 
The contribution rate for the entire social security system has not changed. However 
workers’ salaries were “grossed up” in order to introduce to them the idea that they 
pay part of the contribution and to build their awareness of the overall cost of the 
pension system. As such, since 1 January 1999 both workers and employers share the 
cost of contributions without any real change in the size of the total contributions. The 
whole operation affected percentages but not real flows of money. Thus the new 
system is based on the same contribution inflow as the previous system. 
The contribution due for a worker is divided into four pieces in order to define each 
part of the system well. The main element of the change is splitting the contribution 
into the old age (OA) and the other three non-old-age (NOA) (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Mandatory contributions in Poland before and after implementation of the 
new pension system 
 Total  NDC individual 
account 
FDC individual 
account 
Other elements 
of the system 
before 1-Jan-1999 
Mandatory 
contribution  36.59
a  -- --  36.59 
since 1-Jan-1999 
Mandatory old-age 
(OA) contribution  19.52 12.22  7.3  -- 
Other mandatory 
social welfare (NOA) 
contributions 
17.07  -- --  17.07 
a Equivalent of 45 percent (after grossing-up of labour income). 
 18 
Retirement age does not play any active role in the balancing revenue and expenditure 
sides of the new system. Retirement age is still important from the social policy and 
labour supply point of view. For these reasons, in the new system the minimum 
retirement age is set at 60 for women and 65 for men.
19 However, unlike a traditional 
pension system, this new system can be run at any retirement age.
20 
From the individual perspective, the new system is a method of life cycle income 
allocation. 
¾  Contributions based on a fixed percent of individual earnings create account 
values. 
¾  Account balances from the close of the preceding period earn a rate of return 
based on the growth of the sum of paid contributions. 
¾  Accumulated account values are annuitised at the time of retirement 
¾  Annuities are calculated on the basis of accumulated capital and life expectancy at 
the age of retirement. 
From macroeconomic perspective the system is a method of sharing GDP between 
generations. The key feature of this system is stabilisation of the share being 
transferred to the entire retired generation (GDP
R). Technical (demographic) reserves 
are created in the system in order to smooth fluctuations that inevitably influence its 
revenue and expenditure side. 
Pillar terminology is often used in the area of pensions and with some confusion as to 
definitions and depending upon who is doing the classification.
21 To some extent it is 
used also in Poland, especially for public communications. However, it fits the Polish 
case only partially. If we use this terminology we should say there is no first pillar in 
the system. At the same time the second pillar consists of two types of individual 
accounts (two accounts per participant, one NDC, the other FDCGD/FDCPE) that have 
                                                 
19 Initial reform project set retirement age at 62 for both genders. For political reasons this was not 
accepted. Hopefully this will be possible in the future but up to now no decision has been taken. 
20 It should be remembered that people who retire now are those who are still covered by the old 
system – those whom the new system covered were in the beginning or middle of their working life 
and so will not retire for a number of years yet. So the age of their retirement matters. 
21 For instance, the name “second pillar” can be attributed to a part of the universal system (World 
Bank terminology) or to occupational (partial) schemes (terminology used in many countries). 19 
the same objective (income allocation) but use different ways of generating the rate of 
return (through real economy or through financial markets). Table 3 presents a 
comparison of key features of the three-pillar approach and the Polish approach. 
 
Table 3. Alternative approaches to pension reform 
Typical “three pillar” reform  Security through Diversity 
¾ Rationalised old system (redistribution; 
anonymous participation) „first pillar” 
¾ New part of the system based on 
financial individual accounts run by 
private asset managers „second pillar” 
¾ Contribution split between the old and 
the new system 
¾ Promotion of various forms of 
additional savings „third pillar” 
¾ Splitting social security into OA and 
NOA 
¾ Termination of the OA part of the old 
system 
¾ Creation of entirely new OA part of the 
system (individual accounts of two 
types; annuitisation on retirement; no 
redistribution) 
¾ Contribution split between two 
accounts 
¾ First account – non- financial; rate of 
return determined by GDP growth; 
publicly run (possible privatisation) 
¾ Second account – financial; rate of 
return determined in financial markets; 
privately run 
¾ Annuitisation of account values (both 
accounts) 
¾ Promotion of various forms of 
additional savings 
 
Starting from 1 January 1999 the entirely new system replaced the old one for all 
people born after 31 December 1948. Participation in the new system was not subject 
to individual choice. The new system automatically covered the entire group of 
people born after that date. There was no switching.
22 However, a group of 
participants took decisions on choosing one of two versions of the new system. 
                                                 
22 Offering people the opportunity to take decisions is usually well received. However, the idea of 
universal system means not only universal coverage but also universal rules. Choice is an illusion in a 
mandatory system, which can impose problems. Choice is appropriate for voluntary partial 
programmes. 20 
Decisions were taken in the period until 31 December 1999. Table 4 provides 
summary of the procedure.
23 
 
Table 4. Introduction of the new system (age groups) 
New system (people born after 31 Dec. 1948) 
People born 
after 31 Dec. 1968 
People born 
before 1 Jan. 1969 
Old system (people born 
before 1 Jan. 1949) 
Automatically covered by 
the new system; OA 
contribution automatically 
split between two accounts 
[NDC+FDC] 
Automatically covered by 
the new system; OA 
contribution either split 
between two accounts or 
paid into one account 
[(NDC+FDC) or NDC] 
Stay in the old system (no 
possibility to participate in 
the new one); 
no accounts 
 
The new system covered people who had been previously covered by the old system. 
To be just, already acquired pension rights in the old system had to be recognized in 
the new system. A special procedure transformed them into account values. 
Everybody who had started participation before 1 January 1999 received on their 
NDC account an amount called “initial capital”, reflecting present value of the rights 
acquired under the old system. 
This procedure can be interpreted as retirement of the entire population born after 31 
December 1948, in that they retired according to the old rules (but at an earlier date). 
Their hypothetical benefits were recalculated into amounts that would have been 
needed after reaching retirement age for generating a flow of these benefits. After 
sending all participants to retirement, the old system was terminated. 
It should be stressed that the way of implementation of the new system was rather 
radical, in that it put a complete end to the old system for the vast majority of the 
population. This was possible due to the way in which the system is designed. 
                                                 
23 There were two major exceptions from the procedure presented in Table 4. Agricultural workers kept 
being covered by a special pension scheme. The so-called uniform services (army, police) were 
covered by the new universal system but that concerned only those who started their servicing after 31 
December 1998, while the rest of this group stayed in their special pension scheme. 
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Attempts to introduce minor modifications in pension systems lead to much stronger 
social unrest than reforms changing the rules behind the system. In Poland, there was 
no significant public critique of the way of implementation of the new system and in 
many ways the reform was enthusiastically received. 
Implementation of the new system means ex ante adjustment of the flow of its future 
expenditure. This produces very strong macroeconomic effects. Almost € ½ trillion 
(in 2000 prices) is the value of debt that will not be created until 2050 due to 
implementation of the new OA pension system.
24 Table 5 provides comparative 
projections for OECD countries on demographic dependency ratio, pension 
expenditure and primary surpluses needed to keep debts at their 2000 levels. In 
comparison to projections made for other countries the Polish case looks really very 
strong. The lack of a large part of the pension debt – and hence no need to finance its 
servicing – will give a great deal of freedom to both the public and private sector to 
achieve various goals contributing to the country’s development. 
Two conclusions on the Polish case can be drawn from the projections provided in 
Table 5: 
¾ The demographic situation (measured by the dependency ratio) will change from 
relatively good now to one of the worst in the OECD area in 2050. 
¾ At the same time – due to implementation of the new system – OA pension 
expenditure will substantially drop from one of the highest levels now to one of the 
lowest in the OECD area in 2050. 
Implementation of the new pension system is a complicated task. The structure of the 
system needs to be serviced by various institutions. Management of the pension 
system is an important issue for consideration when designing the system. However, 
management should not be confused with the system itself. This paper does not focus 
on these issues, but Box 1 summarises the most key Polish institutions in the reform 
and their responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
24 For details on projections see Chłoń-Domińczak (2002). 22 
Table 5. Projected effects as compared to other European countries 
Dependency ratio  Pension expenditure (%GDP)  Primary surplus required 
(%GDP) 
 
2000 2050  Change  2000 2050  Change  Debt  constant  Debt  reduced
Australia 20.4  47.0  26.6  3.0  4.5  1.5 ..  .. 
Austria  25.2  58.2  33.0 9.5 11.8 2.3  ..  .. 
Belgium  28.1  49.5  21.4 8.8 12.1 3.3  4.2  5.3 
Canada  20.4  45.9  25.5 5.1 11.0 5.9  3.7  4.5 
Czech  Republic  21.9  57.5  35.6 7.8 14.6 6.8  1.6  1.8 
Denmark 24.2  40.3  16.1  6.1  8.8  2.7  3.7  4.0 
Finland  25.9  50.6  24.7 8.1 12.9 4.8  2.5  2.1 
France  27.2 50.8 23.6 12.1 15.8  3.7  5.9  6.6 
Germany  26.6 53.2 26.6 11.8 16.9  5.1  4.3  4.7 
Hungary 23.7  47.2  23.5  6.0  7.2  1.2 ..  .. 
Island 20.3  44.0  23.7  ..  ..  ..  .. .. 
Ireland 19.7  45.7  26.0  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Italy  28.8 66.8 38.0 14.2 13.9 -0.3  4.9  5.9 
Japan 27.7  64.6  36.9  7.9  8.5  0.6  3.6  4.1 
Korea  11.3  45.4  34.1 2.1 10.1 8.0  3.9  3.5 
Netherlands  21.9  44.9  23.0 5.2 10.0 4.8  6.1  6.6 
New  Zealand 20.4  48.3  27.9 4.8 10.6 5.8  2.9  2.9 
Norway  25.6  41.2  15.6 4.9 12.9 8.0  4.6  4.0 
Poland  20.4 55.2 34.8 10.8  8.3  -2.5  -1.0  -1.0 
Portugal  26.7  50.9  24.2 8.0 12.5 4.5  3.4  3.4 
Spain  27.1  65.7  38.6 9.4 17.4 8.0  4.8  5.2 
Sweden  29.4  46.3  16.9 9.2 10.8 1.6  1.0  1.1 
Switzerland 25.1  45.3  20.2 ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
UK 26.6  45.3  18.7  4.3  3.6  -0.7  0.8  1.2 
USA 21.7  37.9  16.2  4.4  6.2  1.8  2.7  3.2 
OECD  (avg.) 23.8  49.9  26.1 7.4 10.6 3.2  ..  .. 
Source: OECD. See Dang et al. (2001). 
Notice: If only pension expenditure is taken into account then the required surplus 
needed in the case of Poland is even more favourable (-2.8% GDP). 
 
It should be added that managing the majority of tasks can be privatised. This is 
important and will likely improve the efficiency of managing the tasks. However, this 
is a subject of public choice and is not crucial for the pension system itself. 
Although management issues are not discussed in this paper, it needs to be mentioned 
that the day-to-day operations of the new Polish pension system has had some 
difficulties. There are a number of problems concerning processing of information. 
Such information management is essential for the individualised system. The system 
really only needs four pieces of information on each participant, namely: name, 
amount paid, date of payment and wage. The wage information is needed only for 
control purposes. In practice, however, much more information is being collected, and 23 
this has led to problems. Nevertheless, these day-to-day operational issues should not 
be confused with the overall soundness of the policy design. 
 
Box 1. Tasks and managing institutions 
Registration and other initial procedures    ZUS 
Collection of contributions        ZUS (can be privatised) 
Transfer of contributions to OA individual 
accounts and NOA parts of social security    ZUS (can be privatised) 
Running NDC accounts        ZUS (can be privatised) 
Running FDC accounts  Pension Societies (asset 
managers) (private) 
Providing NDC annuities        ZUS (can be privatised) 
Providing FDC annuities        Annuity companies (private)
25 
ZUS=social security institute 
 
The Polish pension reform has yet another feature that is worth mentioning. The new 
system financing is based on accrual accounting. ZUS neither used segmentation nor 
accrual accounting at the start of the new system, and so this tied with the IT system 
problem created the backlog. Information technology implementation has been the 
curse of more than one new public policy initiative. The IT system has now got the 
segmentation and accrual accounting working almost correctly. Implementation of the 
accrual accounting is in line with a general movement from cash accounting 
(traditional in social security, as well as other government activities) to accrual 
accounting, which better ties together income and expenses and allows for easier 
tracking of information and money. 
 
                                                 
25 This element of the institutional structure serving the pension system still needs more legislation. 24 
Key factors behind the success of the pension reform in Poland 
Pension reform is a difficult challenge. Success is not guaranteed. Actual experience 
indicates that failure is rather very likely. Recent evidence from many European 
countries illustrates this very clearly. However, Poland’s case is a success. How was 
this possible? Here are key factors that helped: 
¾  The new system was designed by economists, who were able to focus on 
inputs, outputs and means of the system (rather than by traditional social 
security experts, who tend to focus mostly on outputs of the system); 
¾  The reform team was decoupled from politics, and understood to be made up 
of non-political specialists; 
¾  The new system was designed without pre-set political guidelines; 
¾  The reform team enjoyed political protection from various political powers, 
under various governments; 
¾  The reform project was presented to the public without strong political 
affiliation; 
¾  The reform team was not linked to institutions involved in running the old 
pension system; 
¾  Pre-reform rationalization of the system was not presented to the public as a 
reform; 
¾  The new system was presented to the public as a new opportunity (actuarial 
link of contributions and benefits), not as cutting down old system promises; 
¾  Strong marketing of the new system (media, social partners); 
¾  The new system was designed and implemented before the real pension crisis 
started; 
¾  The reform did not affect pensioners and workers already close to retirement; 
¾  The reform did not increase labour cost; 
¾  The old system was terminated but pension rights acquired under its rule were 
not lost or reduced. 
Discussion of these other factors would be the subject of another paper. 25 
IV.  Final remarks 
Providing people with social security – including financing consumption of the retired 
generation out of the product of the working generation - is very high on the list of 
social priorities in most countries. It is especially important in European societies. 
However, the inefficiency of traditional pension systems put achieving this goal at 
risk. Social and populist rhetoric suggests to the public that changes within the 
pension system are dangerous for social goals. In reality, for most countries in the 
world, it is just the opposite. The longer the traditional pension systems are held up, 
the more socially damaging effects will be created. 
Poland belongs to a non-numerous group of countries that are prepared for one of the 
most difficult challenges of our time, namely the ageing of the population. The new 
pension system will not only stop the increase of costs of the pension system but will 
also allow for their reduction. This will leave more resources available for 
development, which, in turn, will contribute to stronger growth and the increase of 
living standards of both the working and the retired generation. 
The example of the new Polish pension system, as well as the Swedish one, is 
interesting for yet another reason. This type of system contributes to labour mobility, 
which is particularly needed in Europe. Free movement of labour cannot be achieved 
if moving from one country to another affects expected retirement income. As such, 
aiming at pension system neutrality will be more and more important for European 
integration. 26 
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